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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AWARDS FOR
PSYCHONEUROTIC REACTIONS*
THE question of whether and under what circumstances a worker insured
under workmen's compensation should be allowed disability payments for a
psychoneurotic reaction has been presented to judges and administrative boards
with increasing frequency in recent years. Existing doctrines governing the
award of disability payments under workmen's compensation statutes are in
many cases unsuitable for dealing with this form of disturbance. This Comment
will attempt to reevaluate these doctrines in the light of psycho-analytic theories
explaining the causes, essential nature, and symptoms of psychoneurotic re-
actions. It will further evaluate the effect of compensating psychoneurotic in-
juries on the employee and his disturbance.'
THE AwARD oF COMPENSATION
Workmen's compensation statutes generally provide for monetary awards
and medical benefits to employees or their dependents in case of a disabling
injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.2 This sys-
tem developed in reaction to the inadequacy of recovery under common law
tort doctrines and procedures.3 It had been found that under tort law
a) large portions of all fatal and non-fatal injuries remained uncom-
pensated, b) the sums actually paid were frequently inadequate token
compensation, c) recoveries were obtained only after protracted litigation,
d) the attorneys of the injured workmen retained a large share of the
sum actually obtained, [and] e) an undue portion of the premiums paid
by industry went to the insurance companies for profits, administrative
costs and profits, and was thus socially wasted.4
Workmen's compensation statutes reject the common law defenses of con-
tributory negligence, fellow-servant, and assumption of risk in favor of a gen-
eral theory of liability without fault.5 The right to an award, and its amount,
*An earlier version of this Comment was submitted in satisfaction of the writing require-
ment of the Yale Law School's Divisional Program, Law and the Behavioral Sciences
Division, 1960-1961. The Law Journal wishes to thank Professor Richard C. Donnelly for
bringing this paper to the Editors' attention.
1. The discussion in this Comment although limited to psychoneurotic reactions, could
be applied as well to psychotic reactions, ivhich are more serious forms of reactions. On
psychotic reactions see generally, ENGLisH & FINCH, INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHIATRY 43-
44, 332-423 (2d ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as ENGLISH & FINcH].
2. See generally 1 & 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW (1952) [hereinafter
cited as LARsoN]; ScHNIDER, WORKMEN'S COmPENSATION TEXT (1941-60) [hereinafter
cited as SCHNEIER'S TEXT]; SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION STATUTES (1939-
1949).
3. See, e.g., New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
4. RiESENFELD & MAXWELL, MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION 137 (1950).
5. See, e.g., New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917) (upholding consti-
tutionality of liability without fault in a compulsory act), and Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
is initially determined by a workmen's compensation board or state court.6
Awards are paid out of various forms of insurance funds, financed by the em-
ployer through the payment of regular premiums to a state fund or to private
companies or through regulated self-insurance.
7
The underlying goals of the workmen's compensation system are 1) to com-
pensate the worker, his dependents, or survivors for at least part of the wage
loss and medical expenses incurred as a result of industrial injury,8 2) to re-
habilitate the employee so that he can re-enter the labor force and again become
a productive member of the community,9 and 3) to provide a monetary incen-
tive to the employer to minimize occupational injury.10 There are two prin-
cipal limitations on recovery: injury must result in a disability entailing total
or partial incapacity to work," and the injury must "arise out of and in the
course of employment."'1 2 For purposes of determining whether psychoneurotic
injuries are compensable, these goals and limitations of workmen's compen-
sation will be accepted as given.
U.S. 210 (1917) (elective act). However, several defenses, such as intoxication or intent
to injure self or another, are generally available to the employer. See, e.g., N.Y. WORK-
MEN'S ComP. AcT § 10.
6. In the majority of states, a workmen's compensation board makes the initial find-
ing. See, e.g., N.Y. WORKMEN'S ComP. LAW § 141. A small minority, however, have court
administration in the first instance. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 297 (1958). For a con-
sideration of judicial review of compensation awards, see 2 LARSON §§ 80.00 to .42 (1952).
7. See SOMERS & SOMERS, WORKMNIEN'S COMPENSATION 93-142 (1954) [hereinafter
cited as SOMERS & SOMERS] ; 2 LARSON §§ 92.00 to .32.
8. The intent of the legislators was to prevent the employee and his dependents from
becoming public charges. Baltimore Steel Co. v. Burch, 49 A.2d 542, 544 (Md. 1946). But
full wage loss compensation was not intended. Depending upon the degree of incapacity
and its duration, a disability is classified as total or partial, and temporary or permanent.
To limit the amount of remuneration, statutory maximums have been imposed on the period
of time and the percentage of prior wages which may be paid. In addition, the dollar amount
per week is limited as well as the total amount of compensation. See generally 2 LARSON
§8 57.00, 61.20.
Most states, in addition to providing for compensation, allow the employee to recover
the cost of reasonable medical expenses. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-157 (1958) ;
HAwAII REv. LAWS § 97-22 (1955); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 48-120 (1943). Several
states, however, impose a period of limitations and a maximum amount. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE tit. 26, § 293 (1958) (6 months-$1200) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1004 (1955) (1
year-1500). See generally 10 SCHNEIDER'S TEXT §§ 2001-47.
9. Most statutes provide for vocational rehabilitation. See, e.g., Asuz. RFv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 23-501 to -508 (1956) (amount is in commission's discretion); HAwAII REv. LAws
§ 97-26.5 (1955) (up to $1,000 for permanently disabled persons).
10. Three devices have been advanced in an attempt to promote injury prevention:
1) merit rating which is designed to reward firms with favorable injury experience by
allowing reductions in premiums; 2) penalties on employers in the form of increased com-
pensation when an injury results from a violation of a safety code; and 3) accident report-
ing which provides a basis for investigation and control. For a criticism of these devices
in aiding prevention, see SOMERS & SOMERS 197-235 (1954).
11. See notes 32-34 infra and accompanying text.




A psychoneurosis is a mental disorder which is dependent on unconscious
mental causes.13 In finding solutions to his unconscious problems, the individ-
ual develops personality difficulties which, in terms of the individual's adapta-
tion to reality, may be considered to lie somewhere between the reactions and
adjustment mechanisms of the "average" and the psychotic individual.14 Al-
though the sufferer is able to adapt to his social environment, his ego is "warped
and distorted."' 5 The main characteristic of a psychoneurotic reaction is the
development of "anxiety" which may be expressed directly or in a number of
substitute ways since the ego attempts to control anxiety by the use of psycho-
logical defense mechanisms.16 The various ways employed by the individual to
cope with his anxiety give rise to six principal types of psychoneurotic re-
action.17 An anxiety reaction is expressed by a diffuse and constant anxiety not
related to particular situations or objects.' s Associated symptoms of the anxiety
reaction include lack of concentration, depression, irritability, and excitability.19
A phobic reaction results when the anxiety evoked by a specific idea, object,
or situation encountered in daily life is displaced by an intense fear of an idea
or situation which has symbolic significance.20 The sufferer is driven to near
13. See generally FENICHEL, THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF THE NEUROSES (1945)
[hereinafter cited as FENICHEL] ; DEUTSCH, PSYCHOANALYSIS OF THE NEUROSES (1933) ;
ENGLISH & FINCH 139-231; HENDERSON & GILLESPIE, A TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 146-
226 (7th ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as HENDERSON & GILLESPIE].
14. NovEs & KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 490-94 (5th ed. 1958) [hereinafter
cited as NOvEs & KOLB]. A general definition of "average," "normal" or "healthy" has not
been developed. See, e.g., Hartmann, Psychoanalysis and the Concept of Health, INT'L J.
OF PSYCHOANALYSIS XX, (1939) ; Glover, Medico-Psychological Aspects of Normality,
BrT. J. OF PSYCHOLOGY XXII (1932) ; and Jones, The Concept of A Normal Mind, INT'L
J. OF PSYCHOANALYSIS XXIII (1942).
The psychoses involve far more serious personality disruptions than do the psycho-
neuroses. "In the typical psychoses the individual has lost his contact with reality and re-
veals severe disturbances in all areas of his life." ENGLISH & FINCH 43.
15. ENGLISH & FINCH 44. The ego "contains the compromising, solution-forming and
defense-creating aspects of the personality. It evaluates situations and forms judgments.
The ego organization, being in charge of such important functions as perception, memory,
reality evaluating and testing, synthesizing of experience and of acting as intermediary be-
tween the inner and outer world, may be regarded as the integrative and executive agency
of the personality." Noms & KOLB 33.
16. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL-
MENTAL DISORDERS 31-32 (1952) [hereinafter cited as PSYCHIATRIC MANUAL].
17. The classification of psychoneuroses in terms of reactions seems to be the most
fruitful means of viewing the psychoneurotic disorders, for the individual who develops a
psychoneurosis is reacting to various stresses in a manner which is an exaggeration of the
"normal" mode of behavior rather than exhibiting a mental disease. NoyEs & KOLB 83.
Clinically, there are no sharply defined lines among the psychoneuroses, and frequently the
individual will exhibit manifestations of several reactions in varying degrees. NOYES &
KOLB 494. Compare HENDERSON & GILLESPIE 49.
18. ENGLISH & FINCH 140.
19. HENDERSON & GILLEsPm 166-78; Noys & KOLB 498-99.
20. PSYCHIATRIC MANUAL 33.
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panic whenever he encounters his phobic situation.21 An obsessive-compulsive
reaction is similarly linked to particular objects or contexts, but is evidenced
by "unwelcome repetitive ideas or impulses to perform ritualistic acts."122 In a
conversion reaction the individual expresses his unconscious conflicts through
symbolic functional disturbances in parts of the body, usually those that are
mainly under voluntary control.23 Examples are sudden paralysis of an ex-
tremity, or total incapacitation of one of the senses such as seeing or hearing,
accompanied by a calm and unconcerned attitude termed belle indiffrence.24
The dissociative reaction manifests itself by the individual's "walling off certain
areas of the mind from consciousness," 25 resulting in various episodic mental
states such as fugues, 26 somnambulisms,2 7 dream-states, amnesias or multiple
personality.28 In a depressive reaction, the anxiety is partially relieved by a
"chronic state of dejection or despondency accompanied by a tendency toward
self-depreciation.
29
Any of these syndromes can result in either a partial or total inability of the
individual to perform some or all of his normal activities. For example, if a
particular job involves contact with a situation to which a phobia has become
attached, the panic which ensues may completely destroy the individual's ability
to perform the work involved. 0 Although the layman may view the anxiety as
unrealistic, the disturbance which the individual experiences is not imaginary.
The incapacity is as real as that resulting from a "physical" injury.3 1
Not all psychoneuroses will be compensable under a workmen's compensa-
tion statute. Workmen's compensation awards are not made for injury as such,
but for inability to perform or to obtain work produced by such injury.3 2 A
21. ENGLISH & FINCH 191-96; Noxs & KOLB 501-02.
22. See ENGLISH & FINCH 205. See generally FREUD, NOTES UPON A CASE OF OBSES-
SIONAL NEuosis, in 3 COLLECTED PAPERS (1949).
23. PSYCHIATRIC MAN UAL 32-33.
24. ENGLISH & FINCH 158-79; NOYES & KOLB 504-05.
25. ENGLISH & FINCH 180. See generally PRINCE, THE DISSOCIATION OF A PERsoN-
ALITY (1925).
26. A fugue is a state of psychological amnesia, in which the individual may appear to
possess all his mental faculties, but in actuality is either partially or totally incapable of
recalling certain experiences. HIsiS & CAmPBELL, PSYCHIATRIC DIcTIONARY 309 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as HINIsE & CAmPBELL].
27. Somnambulisms are dissociated states identical with fugues except that they begin
during sleep and manifest themselves in sleepwalking. HINSIE & CAMPBELL 684.
28. The latter phrase describes the formation of secondary personalities which escape
the ordinary repression mechanisms and temporarily control the individual. The secondary
personalities possess distinct characteristics operating independently of each other and with
complete ignorance of the existence of both the primary personality and the other sub-
personalities. HENDERSON & GILLESPIE 127, 192.
29. ENGLISH & FINCH 221.
30. No-Es & KOLB 501-02.
31. HENDERSON & GILLESPIE 148.
32. The degree of disability depends upon the inability to perform or to obtain work.
Functional impairment is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an award. An injury
resulting in sexual impotency, for example, is not compensable, for the injury does not
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psychoneurosis will be compensable, therefore, only when it affects the worker's
earning capacity.
The necessity of translating psychiatric terminology and concepts into legally
meaningful economic terms presents a danger that the psychiatrist will be called
upon to make decisions beyond his special competence. Workmen's compensa-
tion boards are dependent upon psychiatrists to provide information as to the
genuineness, cause, severity, duration and extent of the injury. But psychiatrists
are not qualified to estimate the percentage of normal earning capacity which
has been lost due to the injury. This decision requires familiarity with a myriad
of industrial practices and employment opportunities.3 3 It also requires deter-
minations involving the reasonableness of alternatives and substitutes open to
the claimant,34 social value judgments which seem peculiarly within the com-
petence of the legal tribunal.35
In addition, the psychiatrist may be restricted as to the information he can
give within his own area of competence. A disability award typically requires
an estimation of the duration and severity of the illness for the purpose of cal-
culating the duration and amount of payments.3 6 But accurate prognosis of the
affect ability to obtain or hold a job. Except for schedule injury provisions, which catalogue
rates for loss of specific members of the body irrespective of loss of earning capacity, the
degree of disability is presumptively determined by comparing pre-injury earnings with
post injury earning ability.
33. For example, earning capacity is determined by selecting a base period of time and
discounting such factors as change in general wage levels since the accident, see, e.g.,
Whyte v. Industrial Comm'n, 227 P.2d 230 (Ariz. 1951) ; Artac v. Union Collieries Co.,
149 Pa. Super. 449, 27 A.2d 782 (1942) ; changes in claimant's age, Malcolm v. Bowhill
Coal Co., [1910] Sess. Cas. 447 (Scot 1st Div.) ; training, Ludwickson v. Central States
Elec. Co., 142 Neb. 308, 6 N.W.2d 65 (1942) ; hours of work, Devlin v. Iron Works Creek
Constr. Corp., 164 Pa. Super. 481, 66 A.2d 221 (1949) ; and payment of disproportionate
wages because of employer's sympathy, Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Hoage, 85 F.2d 420
(D.C. Cir. 1936); Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Rose, 217 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949).
34. Generally courts hold that the post-injury earnings may result from any kind of
employment. See, e.g., Clark v. Henry & Wright Mfg. Co., 136 Conn. 514, 72 A.2d 489
(1950). However, some courts require that the earning capacity be in the same employ-
ment. Allen v. National Twist Drill & Tool Co., 324 Mich. 660, 37 N.W.2d 664 (1949) ;
Honeycutt v. Carolina Asbestos Co., 235 N.C. 471, 70 S.E.2d 426 (1952) (special statutory
provision for disability for asbestosis or silicosis), or in work of any reasonable character,
Washington v. Independent Ice & Cold Storage Co., 211 La. 690, 30 So. 2d 758 (1947).
Despite sporadic earnings, a worker may be found totally disabled if his physical condition
disqualifies him for regular employment. Similarly, the worker's inability to obtain work
because of his injury will support a total disability award although he is medically able to
function on a job. See, e.g., Czeplicki v. Fafnir Bearing Co., 137 Conn. 454, 78 A.2d 339
(1951); Leonardo v. Uncas Mfg. Co., 75 A.2d 188 (PI. 1950).
35. See generally Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness, Some Obser-
vations on the Decision to Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J.
225 (1960) (allocation of responsibility for decision-making between the psychiatrist and
the court).
36. Compensation is generally awarded for a specified percentage of disability for a
fixed number of weeks, with the employer and employee both having the right to reopen
the award for changed conditions. See, e.g., N.Y. WoRKMAN's CoMMr. LAwV § 15.
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duration and severity of an individual psychoneurotic reaction may often be
impossible. A prognosis must be based upon detailed information regarding
the past experiences of the individual, his present reactions and adjustments,
and the environmental factors which may affect him in the future.3 7 In addition
to the possibility that there may not be enough time to compile sufficient data,
psychiatric prognosis is made inherently unreliable by the fact that unforeseen
factors may arise during the course of therapy which sustain or alleviate the
psychoneurosis. These factors may consist of changes in the patient's life situa-
tion, for example death of a close relative, or newly acquired insights into the
patient's mental state, such as the discovery of a hidden psychosis or unusual
attributes.38
In some cases it may even be difficult to obtain an adequate medical diagnosis
of the causes and present condition of a psychoneurotic injury. Some em-
ployees suffering from a psychoneurotic reaction may refuse to undergo ex-
amination,3 9 or may not cooperate sufficiently. Moreover, a reliable psychiatric
diagnosis may require a lengthy investigation to acquire the necessary infor-
mation regarding the individual's past experiences.40 The expense of such ex-
aminations may create additional obstacles to accurate diagnosis. Ordinarily,
the cost of initial medical examination is borne by the employer.41 Presumably,
this obligation includes the duty to provide psychiatric diagnosis when it is
needed. But because of ignorance regarding psychoneurotic disturbances, or
because of doubts as to their cause or genuineness in individual cases, an em-
ployer may be reluctant to authorize a costly examination, or may attempt to
provide only a limited kind of diagnosis. If the employer refuses, or if the
employee is dissatisfied with the thoroughness or the conclusion of the em-
ployer's psychiatrist, he may of course consult a psychiatrist of his own choos-
ing. But there is a possibility that the employee will not be reimbursed for this
private examination; moreover, the responsibility for payment may often be
difficult to ascertain in advance, particularly in the case of psychoneurotic re-
actions.42 In these circumstances, an injured workman may be reluctant to risk
37. Cf. ENGLISH & FINcH 70-100; NoYEs & KOLB 130-69; HENDERSON & GILLESPIE
89-106. A prognosis differs from a diagnosis in that the former includes only a forecast or
estimate of the course, outcome, and duration of an illness, whereas the latter, although it
may include a prediction of the future course of the reaction, is usually limited to a state-
ment of the past and present conditions and experiences of the patient.
38. Freud, A., Child Observation and Prediction of Development, 13 PsycHOANALYTIc
STUDY OF THE CHiLD 92-116 (1958).
39. The court's determination of the reasonableness of undergoing a psychiatric ex-
amination may be decisive on the incidence of employee refusal to submit to a psychiatric
diagnosis, for it is generally held that an unreasonable refusal to submit to a medical ex-
amination will result in a denial of compensation, see, e.g., Cole v. Town of Miami, 52
Ariz. 488, 83 P.2d 997 (1938) ; 10 SCHNEIDER'S TEXT § 2018.
40. See ENGLIsH & FIc 70-100.
41. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 293.
42. Several factors may cause the employee to hesitate in seeking further psychiatric
diagnosis. Recognizing that "many persons think they need medical attention when in fact
they do not," Lowman v. Amphitheatre School District No. 10, 56 Ariz. 516, 517-18, 109
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incurring a large expense for diagnosis. Some workmen's compensation statutes
allow the administrative board to call in impartial medical witnesses at the
state's expense.43 This procedure might remedy some of the problems when
insufficient psychiatric data is presented. Whether this alternative can provide
a satisfactory solution to the problem will depend on several factors-the cost
of reliable diagnosis when state personnel are used," the number of cases in
which such additional testimony is needed, and the amount of funds available.
The Physical Impact or Injury Rule
Some legislatures and courts have imposed an additional barrier to recovery
in the form of a physical impact or injury requirement. This rule, in force in
a diminishing number of states, does not allow compensation for psychoneurotic
reactions unless the disturbance is the result of some "physical" impact on the
body, or unless the resulting injury can in some sense be defined as "physical. ' 45
Thus, in jurisdictions where the rule is still adhered to, a psychoneurosis un-
accompanied by either contemporaneous physical impact or resultant physical
injury will be held non-compensable. 46 For example, in Bekeleski v. 0. F. Neal
P.2d 617, 618 (1941), some courts have held that the cost of medical examination and treat-
ment may be recovered even though the injury did not result in either a temporary or
permanent disability; but they have limited the amount of medical expenses that may be
recovered in such cases to those "necessarily incurred" as a result of the accident. Lowman
v. Industrial Comm'n, 54 Ariz. 413, 96 P.2d 405 (1939) and Lowman v. Amphitheatre
School Dist. No. 10, 56 Ariz. 516, 517-18, 109 P.2d 617, 618 (1941). Furthermore, reim-
bursement of medical expenses, including the cost of examination and diagnosis, generally
will not be ordered if the injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment. See,
e.g., Industrial Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 103 Cal. App. 2d 249, 229 P.2d 2
(1951), Owsiejko v. American Hardware Corp., 137 Conn. 185, 75 A.2d 404 (1950). Since
proof of the causal relationship between the employment and the psychoneuroses may be
difficult in many cases, see notes 101-05 infra and accompanying text, and since the symp-
toms which an employee suffers may not constitute a disability (indeed they may be held
not to constitute an injury), the employee may not be able to recover the cost of the
psychiatric diagnoses which he procures on his own initiative. Because of the time needed
for adequate diagnosis this cost may be considerable.
43. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 293.
44. Although the cost of using a staff psychiatrist on salary to the state may appear
to be small, the real cost may be in the strain it places on other institutional needs.
45. Generally, courts will allow compensation for a psychoneurotic reaction if it was
preceded by a physical impact. See, e.g., Redfearn v. Sparks Withington Co., 353 Mich.
286, 91 N.W.2d 516 (1958) ; Buck & Simmons Auto & Elec. Supply Co. v. Kesterson, 194
Tenn. 115, 250 S.W.2d 39 (1952). Those denying compensation have generally held that
the claimant has failed to establish a causal connection between the injury and psychoneu-
rosis. See, e.g., Miller Rasmussen Ice & Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 263 Wis. 538, 57
N.W.2d 736 (1953) ; Quillen v. 0. D. Purington Co., 80 R.I. 165, 94 A.2d 247 (1953). In
addition, courts have generally allowed compensation where physical injuries result from
a mental stimulus, such as fright or excitement. See, e.g., Hall v. Doremus, 114 N.J.L. 47,
175 Atl. 369 (1934) ; Roberts v. Dredge Fund, 71 Ida. 380, 232 P.2d 975 (1951); Egan's
Case, 116 N.E.2d 844 (Mass. 1954). Contra, Toth v. Standard Oil Co., 160 Ohio 1, 113
N.E.2d 81 (1953).
46. See, e.g., Chernin v. Progress Serv. Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 170, 192 N.Y.S.2d 758
(1959) (denial of award to taxicab driver for aggravation of a repressed schizophrenia due
11351961]
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Co.,47 the Nebraska court, applying a statute which defined injury as "only
violence to the physical structure of the body," 48 held that the "language in-
dicates a clear distinction between physical and bodily injury on the one hand,
and mental, nervous, and psychiatric injury unaccompanied by violence to the
physical structure of the body on the other."49 The court denied compensation
to an elevator operator who had been in an elevator for thirty minutes with a
dying man. The claimant had sustained no physical injuries, but was unable
to perform her work because of a psychoneurosis. A similar result was reached
in City Ice & Fuel Div. v. Smith.50 The claimant suffered a jolt when a pass-
ing car sideswiped his truck, and four days later he went into a stupor which
was diagnosed as "conversion hysteria"8 1 and possible "dementia praecox,
catatonic type."52 The Florida court, limited by the statutory provision that
"a mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only.. . shall be deemed
not to be an injury by accident arising out of the employment,"' 3 held that the
absence of physical trauma defeated the plaintiff's claim.
On the other hand, several courts have followed a British precedent 5 4 in
allowing compensation. Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co.65 involved an iron-
worker who saw a fellow employee plunge to his death when a scaffold on
which they had both been working gave way. The claimant himself had been
able to swing to safety. Although he did suffer bruises, they were minor, healed
within a short time, and did not "cause or contribute to any disability."50 But
he did develop an anxiety reaction and was unable to continue as an iron-
worker. Operating under a similar statutory definition as that in Bekeleski, the
court construed the phrase "damage or harm to the physical structure of the
body"57 as meaning a failure of the body to function properly. The court ex-
to emotional strain of police investigation of a minor traffic accident). Contra, Burlington
Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (1941) ; Simon v. R.H.H. Steel Laun-
dry, 25 N.J. Super. 50, 95 A.2d 446 (Hudson County Ct.), aff'd, 26 N.J. Super. 598, 98
A.2d 604 (App. Div. 1953). For a review of cases on this point, see Carter v. General
Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960).
47. 141 Neb. 657, 4 N.W.2d 741 (1942).
48. NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 48-151(4) (1943).
49. 141 Neb. at 660, 4 N.W2d at 743.
50. 56 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1952).
51. Conversion hysteria is the term formerly used to describe the symptoms of conver-
sion reaction. See PSYCHIATRIC MANUAL 33.
52. This term, which is equivalent to the more widely favored term "catatonic schizo-
phrenia," represents a group of psychotic reactions generally "characterized by fundamental
disturbances in reality relationships and concept formations .... Conspicuous motor be-
havior, exhibiting either marked generalized inhibition ... or excessive motor activity and
excitement" characterize the catatonic type of schizophrenia. PSYCHIATRIC MANUAL 26.
53. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.02(19) (1952).
54. Yates v. South Kirby & Co. Collieries, Ltd., t1910] 2 K.B. 538 (a mine worker
who developed a disabling psychoneurotic reaction after aiding a dying co-employee was
granted ompensation).
55. 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955).
56. Id. at 432.
57. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306(20).
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pressly refused to make a distinction between physical and mental injuries. s
In Charon's Case r9 where the issue was the physical nature of the causal factor,
a statute which required "personal injury" 60 arising out of and in the course
of his employment was held not to exclude a disability "merely because the in-
jury was not occasioned by physical impact or the application of some form of
external violence to the body."'61 The claimant suffered from a conversion re-
action in the form of a paralysis of her left side as the result of fright occasioned
by a loud noise and flash of light created when lightning struck the building in
which she was working.
The separate category reserved for "physical" injuries has little support in
psychiatric theory, which regards man as an integrated being.62 The rule is
sometimes rationalized, however, by appeal to administrative considerations. It
is contended, for example, that the "physical" injury requirement will guarantee
the genuineness of the claim.0 3 But use of this rule as a protective device places
a heavier burden of proof on those suffering from mental disturbances without
any basis for such a distinction. In fact, conscious simulation of the often com-
plex patterns of psychoneurotic reactions may be easier to detect than 'certain
feigned "physical" injuries such as whiplash or back injury.64 While detection
of falsified claims may be made difficult if the testimony of medical witnesses is
partial or perjured, this danger seems no less present in cases where there has
been a physical impact or injury.
Similarly, the requirement of a physical impact cannot be justified as a safe-
guard to ensure that there is a cause-in-fact relationship between injury and
employment.65 Non-physical factors can precipitate a neurotic disturbance as
readily as physical factors, perhaps even more readily."6 Moreover, the presence
of a physical impact does not make the fact of cause any easier to establish. The
58. 154 Tex. at 440.
59. 321 Mass. 694, 75 N.E.2d 511 (1947).
60. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 152, § 526 (1957). ("If an employee.. . receives a personal
injury arising out of and in the course of his employment . . . he shall be paid compen-
sation.")
61. 321 Mass. at 695, 75 N.E.2d at 512.
62. See, e.g., Kubie, The Neurotic Process as the Focus of Physiological and Psycho-
analytic Research, 104 JOURNAL OF MENTAL SCIENCE 518 (1958) ; MENNINGER, PSYCHIA-
TRY nT A TROUBLED WORLD 163 (1948); DrETHELm, INTRODUCTION To TREATMENT IN
PSYCHIATRY (1950) ; STRECKER, PRACTICAL CINICAL PSYCHIATRY 430 (7th ed. 1957).
63. The belief that physical injury is necessary to ensure the genuineness of the claim
stems from early tort decisions. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 109, 45
N.E. 354, 355 (1896) ; Kalen v. Terre Haute & I.R.R., 18 Ind. App. 202, 206, 47 N.E. 694,
697-98 (1897). This argument has been rejected, however, in many cases. See, e.g., Chiu-
chiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 336-37, 150 Atl. 540, 543 (1930).
64. WECHSLER, THE NEUROSES 246 (1929); Keschner, Simulation (Malingering) In
Relation to Injuries of the Skull, Brain and Spinal Cord, in INjuRIES OF THE SxUii-,
BRaIN AND SPINAL CORD 342-68 (Brock ed. 1943) [hereinafter cited as Keschner] (pre-
senting several devices for detecting malingering of various mental disorders).
65. See, e.g., Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 336-37, 150
Atl. 540, 543 (1930).
66. See, e.g., GUrTmAcHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAv 45 (1952) [here-
inafter cited as GUTTm CHER & WEiHOFEN] ; Dunne, The Psychiatrist and Compensation
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actual occurrence of an alleged stimulus should be relatively easy to ascertain,
regardless of whether it involves physical impact or not. The crucial question
is whether that particular stimulus precipitated the psychoneurosis, and that
question involves a judgment as to the relationship between events and mental
reactions-a judgment which is no more "tangible" when physical impact is
involved than when it is not.
67
Courts in deciding tort cases have recognized the ineffectiveness of the im-
pact rule in establishing cause-in-fact and have undercut that requirement by
allowing all but the most trivial of impacts to suffice.68 While the broadening
of admissible "causes" seems desirable, the reluctance to consider trivial events
suggests a mistaken view as to the nature of precipitating events. The courts
apparently believe that the intensity of a stimulus is related to the likelihood
that the stimulus was a cause of the psychoneurotic reaction. 9 Psychiatrists
believe that there is either no correlation between the intensity of the trauma
and the resultant neurosis, 70 or that the seriousness of the neurosis varies in-
versely with the severity of the triggering event.71
The Accident and Causality Requirements
In order for an employee to recover in a workmen's compensation case, he
must establish that his disability occurred "by accident, 72 arising out of and in
Neuroses, 1 BIrT. MEDICAL. J. 427-29 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Dunne]; BREND,
TRAumATIc DIsoRDERs IN CouRTs 23 (1938) [hereinafter cited as BREND]. See generally
Pokorny & Moore, Neuroses and Compensation: Chronic Psychiatric Disorders Following
Injury or Stress in Compensation Situations, I Review of the Literature, 8 AMERICAN
MEDICAL AssocIATIoN ARCHIVES OF INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE AND OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE
547-63 (1953).
67. The emphasis on physical impact "overemphasizes one factor of stress with result-
ant understatement of other stresses and of the individual organism's propensity for break-
down." Modlen, The Trauma in Traumatic Neurosis, 1960 MENNINGER CLINIC BULLETIN
49. The disfavor among psychiatrists of the term traumatic neurosis, which literally means
a psychogenic disorder shortly following a physical injury, is indicative of the belief that
physical impact does not guarantee a significant "causal" relationship. Cf. PSYCHIATRIC
MANUAL 32. Various verbal formulae have been substituted for the phrase in an attempt
to stress that a physical trauma is not a necessary or sufficient basis of a psychoneurotic
reaction. Eliasberg, Challenge of Social Neuroses, 94 J. OF NERVOUS AND MENTAL DIs-
ORDERS 676-87 (1941) uses the term "social neurosis." Kennedy, Mind of the Injured
Worker: Its Effects on Disability Periods, 1 COMPENSATION MEDICINE 19-24 (1946) [here-
inafter cited as Kennedy], employs the phrases "neurosis following trauma" and "neurosis
following accident"; Reed, Psychology of Trauma: Explanation and Classification of At-
titudes of the Injured and Their Bearing on Compensation, 2 INDUSTRIAL MEDICINE 157-
61 (1933) refers to psychoneurotic reactions as "unconscious malingering"; and Ramsey,
Nervous Disorder After Injury: Review of 400 Cases, 2 BRIT. MEDICAL J. 385-90 (1939)
[hereinafter cited as Ramsey], utilizes the concept of "justice neuroses."
68. Cf. Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 172 Mass. 488, 52 N.E. 747 (1899) ; Morton v. Stack,
122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930).
69. Cf. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 18.4, at 1034 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER
& JAMES].
70. See Ramsey, 385-90; GUTTMACHER & WEiroFEN 45; Dunne 427.
71. See Kennedy 19-24; NoYES & KOLB 514; BREND 23.
72. The phrase "by accident" is used in the majority of states. See, e.g., ALA. CODE
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the course of employment."'13 Most jurisdictions hold that the accident require-
ment is satisfied if either the cause of the injury was accidental or the injury
itself was the unexpected result of the routine performance of the worker's
duties.7 4 Several courts require, however, that the exertion or activity be un-
usual.75 In addition, many courts have held that the injury must be traceable to
a reasonably definite time, place, occasion or cause.7 As part of the tendency
to allow compensation in a greater number of cases, courts have expanded the
several interpretations of the accident standard. The definiteness-of-time crite-
rion, for example, has been extended so that a cause which operates over a
period of several months satisfies the requirements.77 Similarly, the date on
which the inability to work manifests itself has been held to satisfy the sudden
result requirement, although it was preceded by a gradual and lengthy deteri-
oration.78 And where the injury is precipitated by a series of events, courts
have allowed compensation by categorizing each incident as a separate acci-
dent.
79
Although the accident requirement in some form may be necessary for stat-
ute of limitations and other purposes,8 0 a strict application of the accident
criteria as line drawing devices to separate compensable and non-compensable
injuries will yield arbitrary results in cases of psychoneurotic reactions.8' A
psychoneurotic reaction may not develop at a determinable date,8 2 and may be
ANN. tit. 26, § 253 (1958) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2304 (1953). Several statutes pro-
vide that the term injury shall mean phrase "accidental injury." See, e.g., CoNN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 31-139 (1960). A few states have no accident requirement in their basic
coverage clause, but use the term elsewhere in the statute. The courts of these states have
generally read the accident requirement into the coverage clause. See, e.g., Arnold v. Ogle
Constr. Co., 333 Mich. 652, 53 N.W.2d 655 (1952) ; but see Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n
v. Mincey, 255 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
73. See notes 87-100 infra and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Lewis v. Dept. of Law Enforcement, 79 Idaho 40, 311 P.2d 976 (1957);
Carroll v. Industrial Comm'n, 69 Colo. 473, 195 Pac. 1097 (1921). The American decisions
are based on an early English case. Fenton v. Thorley & Co., [1903] A.C. 443, 448 (an
accident is "an unlooked for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or de-
signed").
75. See, e.g., Seiler v. Robinson, 24 N.J. Super. 559, 95 A.2d 153 (1953); Contra,
Lewis v. Dep't of Law Enforcement, 79 Idaho 40, 311 P.2d 976 (1957).
76. Hillerich & Bradsby Co. v. Parker, 267 S.W.2d 746 (Ky. 1954) ; Gray's Hatchery
& Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Stevens, 46 Del. 191, 81 A.2d 322 (1950).
77. See, e.g., Walter v. Hagianis, 97 N.H. 314, 87 A.2d 154 (1952).
78. See, e.g., Kacavisti v. Sprague Elec. Co., 102 N.H. 266, 155 A.2d 183 (1959).
79. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. v. Byrd, 215 Miss. 234, 60 So. 2d 645 (1952) ; Aldrich
v. Dole, 43 Idaho 30, 249 Pac. 87 (1926).
80. A specific date of injury, for example, may be necessary to determine such matters
as which employer or carrier is to bear the risk, whether statutory amendments were in
effect, or what wage basis applies.
81. See, e.g., Voss v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 14 N.J. Misc. 791, 187 Atl. 334
(Dept. Labor, Workmen's Comp. Bur. 1936) (Claimant, an insurance clerk was called an
"idiot" by a fellow worker, and developed a nervous disability. The court denied compen-
sation on the grounds that there was no accidental occurrence.).
82. See ENLiSH & FuicH 163 ("The onset of [conversion reaction] ... symptoms
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triggered by a usual, expected event,83 occurring at a definite or indefinite
time.84 Nor can the use of the accident standard in cases of psychoneurosis be
justified as providing evidentiary value, or as aiding in determining the sever-
ity and permanence of the disability, preventing injury, or rehabilitating the
worker. For example, the accident requirement does not facilitate proof of the
existence of a psychoneurosis, since, as has been seen, the permanence and
severity of a psychoneurotic injury do not depend upon the occurrence of an
accident. 85 Moreover, as is evident from heart attack cases, the accident crite-
rion is too often misused as a means of avoiding an analysis of causation."
Proof of a causal relation should be determined by criteria established for that
specific purpose.
The causality requirement is generally embodied in the phrase "arising out
of and in the course of employment."8 The clause has been separated into two
portions with "arising out of" referring to causality, and "in the course of"
referring to the time, place and circumstances in which the accident occurs.88
The application of both clauses to cases of psychoneurotic reactions, however,
may yield unsatisfactory results.
"Arising out of employment" has been the fruitful (or fruitless) source of
a mass of decisions turning upon nice distinctions and supported by refine-
ments so subtle as to leave the mind of the reader in a maze of confusion.
From their number counsel can, in most cases, cite what seems to be an
authority for resolving in his favour, on whichever side he may be, the
question in dispute.8 9
Because fault and the foreseeabiity of its consequences have no place in work-
men's compensation law, the tort doctrine of proximate cause has been re-
jected.90 Instead, judges and commentators have tended to talk in terms of
"risk." The accident is held to arise out of employment if a risk of that accident
is often dramatic, . . . not infrequently, however, in the neurotically disposed individual
the conversion symptoms gradually become evident... ").
83. See note 104 infra and accompanying text.
84. Dunne 427.
85. See notes 70 & 71 supra and accompanying text.
86. See 1 LARsoN §§ 38.80 to .83. But cf. Bollinger v. Wagaraw Bldg. Supply Co., 122
N.J.L. 512, 6 A.2d 396 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939) (if the "arising out of" test has been satis-
fied, the "accident" requirement will also be deemed satisfied).
87. This phraseology is used in the majority of states. See, e.g., N.Y. WVORa,.N's
ComP. LAW § 10; Iu.. ANN. STAT. cl. 48. § 138 (Smith-Hurd 1960). But see UTAH CoDE
ANN. § 35-1-45 (1953) ("arising out of or in the course of employment"); W. VA. COD.
ANN. § 2526(1) (1955) ("resulting from employment"). Several states have omitted the
"arising out of" section. See, e.g., N.D. REv. CODE § 65-05-05 (1960); TEXAs REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 8306-3b (1956). The phrase "in the course of" has also been modified in
several states. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.03 (1957) ("performing service growing
out of and incidental to his employment").
88. See 1 LARsoN §§ 6.00, 29.22.
89. Herbert v. Samuel Fox & Co., [1916] A.C. 405, 419.
90. See, e.g., New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 205 (1917).
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occurring was created by the employment situation.91 One commentator has
attempted to categorize risks as: 1) clearly associated with the employment,
2) personal to the employee, 3) neutral (occurring at work but neither distinct-
ly personal nor distinctly associated with employment), and 4) mixed (both a
personal and employment cause) .92 These categories have little meaning, how-
ever. The fact that every accident occurs at work means that some part of the
risk of injury can be attributed to the employment situation. The crucial issue
is the kind or quality of risk which employment must create in order to satisfy
the minimum requirement of legal causation.
Several different tests have been employed by various jurisdictions in deter-
mining what kinds of risks constitute a sufficient causal connection. The peculiar
risk test, which has now largely been abandoned, requires that the kind of risk
which results in injury be one which is peculiar to the employment situation
and is not encountered by the general public.9 3 The increased risk standard,
which replaced it in most jurisdictions, demands that the statistical probability
of injury created by employment be greater than the risk experienced by the
general public.04 A considerable number of states have gone beyond this stand-
ard, and, as a concomitant of a growing trend toward wider compensation, 95
have accepted an actual or positional risk test which seems to require only
cause in fact betveen the injury and employment, often expressed in terms of
a but-for theory.0 6 Although usually undefined, "but-for" apparently means
that if a given employment event had not occurred, the probabilities are great
that the injury would not have happened. 97 Unlike the others, this test is not
a prospective comparison of the probabilities of injury, but is rather a retro-
91. See notes 93-100 infra and accompanying text.
92. 1 LARSox §§ 7.00-.40.
93. See, e.g., Industrial Comm'n v. Anderson, 69 Colo. 147, 169 Pac. 135 (1917);
Wamboldt's Case, 265 Mass. 300, 163 N.E. 910 (1928) ; Star Publishing Co. v. Jackson,
115 Ind. App. 221, 58 N.E.2d 202 (1942) (compensation denied for neurosis on grounds that
neurosis could occur in "countless occupations").
94. See, e.g., Cudahy Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 424-26 (1923); Finnegan v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 162 N.E.2d 216, 222 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
95. See, e.g., Tinsman Mfg. Co. v. Sparks, 211 Ark. 554, 562-64, 201 S.W.2d 573, 575-
76 (1947) ; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Holmes, 145 Tex. 158, 169, 196 S.W.2d 390,
394 (1946).
96. See, e.g., Crotty v. Driver Harris Co., 49 N.J. Super. 60, 139 A.2d 126, 133 (Super.
Ct. 1958) ; Gargiulo v. Gargiulo, 13 N.J. 8, 97 A.2d 593 (1953) ; Harvey v. Caddo De Soto
Cotton Oil Co., 199 La. 720, 6 So. 2d 747 (1942).
97. See, e.g., Crotty v. Driver Harris Co., supra note 96. ('Limitation on 'but for is
not related to the probabilities of the injury occurring qua injury, but to whether it is just
as probable that the injury would have occurred somewhere else as at the time and place
it did.") Several statements of the "positional" risk theory have been presented which go
further in the direction of compensability. See, e.g., Kern v. Southport Mill, 174 La. 432,
438, 141 So. 19, 21 (1932) ("when one finds himself at the scene of an accident... because
the necessities of his business called him there, the injuries he may suffer by reason of such
accident 'arise out of' the necessity which brought him there, and hence 'arise out of' his
employment.").
1961]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
active comparison which includes all the peculiar facts giving rise to the actual
accident. 98
The but-for test, as well as the other tests, is often applied simultaneously
with the principle that if a pre-existing disease or weakness is present and is
aggravated or hastened to any extent by the employment, the resulting injury
will be compensated in full.99 This approach has resulted in compensation be-
ing granted even when the statistical probabilities were quite high that the in-
jury (or more accurately, a similar precipitating event) would have occurred
in the absence of the employment-event. 00 Whenever courts following this
rule categorize certain injuries as aggravations of pre-existing conditions, there-
fore, compensation is made to depend upon a lesser requirement of probable
statistical correlation than is necessitated by the but-for test.
,Unfortunately, the complex etiology of psychoneurosis and the demands of
time for examination are such that in a substantial number of cases a psychia-
trist will be unable to estimate with any degree of accuracy the probabilities of
the injury occurring in the absence of employment.' 0' All major schools of
psychoanalytic thought agree that although immediate factors of reality may
serve as precipitating or exciting causes, the adult's predisposition towards a
psychoneurotic reaction lies in the childhood. 10 2 The existence within the un-
conscious of unresolved conflicts, aggression, unrecognized motivations, and
repressed hostilities from childhood onward may create conflicts with which
the ego is incapable of coping. The individual is then particularly susceptible
to the production of a psychoneurotic reaction as a way of relieving any addi-
98. See, e.g., Harvey v. Caddo De Soto Cotton Oil Co., 199 La. 720, 727, 6 So. 2d 747,
749 (1942) (the accident "need not have been foreseen or expected, but after the event it
must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and to have
flowed from that source as a rational consequence").
99. See, e.g., Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. v. Byrd, 215 Miss. 234, 60 So. 2d 645 (1952).
Cf. Geltman v. Reliable Linen & Supply Co., 128 N.J.L. 443, 25 A.2d 894 (Ct. Err. & App.
1942) ; Church v. Westchester Cty., 253 App. Div. 859, 1 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1938).
An attempt to apportion the responsibility for psychoneurotic reactions by determining
the significance of the employment as a contributing factor would present an insurmount-
able task. In most cases a psychiatrist could not give a meaningful estimate. Even if this
were not true, apportionment has not been favored, and only a few states have apportion-
ment provisions which would be appropriate in this situation. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 342.005(1) (1955); N.D. REv. CODE § 65-05-15 (1960). Apportionment, in the
absence of statute, does not apply where the prior condition did not constitute a disability
in the compensation sense. See, e.g., Eagle Indem. Co. v. Hadley, 70 Ariz. 179, 218 P.2d
488 (1950) ; O'Brien v. Manchester Yarn Mills, 95 N.H. 118, 59 A.2d 172 (1948).
100. Compare existing tort doctrine which measures the defendant's standard of con-
duct by the reactions of the "normal" person, unless the defendant has actual or construc-
tive notice of plaintiff's hypersensitivity. The defendant's conduct must involve foreseeable
risk of harm to a class of people which includes the plaintiff, e.g., Chiuchiolo v. New Eng-
land Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 337, 150 Atl. 540, 544 (1930) ; Price v. Yellow Pine
Paper Mill Co., 240 S.W. 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) ; 2 HARPER & JAMES § 18.4, at 1035.
101. See generally FENICHEL; ENGLISH & FINCH 70-100, 139-231.
102. See NoyEs & KoLB 76-86. See generally FENICHEL; ENGLIsH & FINcH 139-231.
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tion tension.10 3 Whether a given experience or combination of experiences will
trigger the psychoneurotic potential into a psychoneurosis will depend on the
vulnerability of the individual and the nature and duration of the stresses bear-
ing upon him.10 4 In such cases, the causation requirement, whether in the form
of the but-for or aggravated injury rule, is of little assistance in deciding
whether to award compensation. Some causal connection with an employment
event can probably be established in most cases, but since a constellation of
factors is at work, it is freqeuntly impossible to determine the causal signifi-
cance of any one factor. The coronary thrombosis cases, which have employed
these criteria, illustrate the inappropriateness of applying either standard of
causation to medical situations in which a single cause cannot be identified.
Indeed, to follow the causal analysis of these heart attack decisions would be
to enter a maze without a map, for they show no logical consistency.'0 5
In those cases where cause-in-fact can neither be proven nor negated, the
decision to grant or deny compensation should depend in large part upon the
court's interpretation of the purpose of the causation requirement and the
policies behind the workmen's compensation statutes. In this situation courts
are confronted with several possibilities. First, in accord with the growing
liberality of compensation and as a result of increased awareness of the in-
definite origins of industrial injuries, the courts could allow compensation for
all psychoneurotic injuries suffered by an employee for the reason that employ-
ment, like every other phase of the worker's environment, has in some measure
contributed to his injury. Furthermore, imposition of higher rate costs on the
employer could be justified in terms of the humanitarian purposes of shifting
the risk, as between two innocent parties, to the one who can best bear or dis-
tribute the cost. 06 Whether such increased costs constitute an actual burden
upon the employer, or whether he can pass the cost on to consumers, suppliers,
or employees, depends on a variety of factors, such as the employer's monopoly
position, growth rate, stage of development, degree of competition between
similar industries and their comparative accident costs, and the flexibility of
output, demand, and resource supply. 1 7 On the other hand, compensation could
103. Kubie, The Neurotic Potential, the Neurotic Process and the Neurotic State,
2 UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES MEDICAL 3. 1 (1951).
104. See, e.g., KRAms, THE THERAPY OF THE NEUROSES AND PsYcHosEs 157 (1948);
Saul & Lyons, Acute Neurotic Reactionm, in DYNAMIC PSYCHIATRY 140 (Alexander &
Ross ed. 1952).
105. See 1 LARsoN §§ 38.64, 38.80 to .83.
106. See, e.g., Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 424 (1923) (the "equi-
table distribution of the economic burdens in cases of personal injury ... is a matter of
sufficient public concern to escape condemnation as arbitrary, capricious or clearly un-
reasonable.").
107. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499 (1961). The cases, however, frequently assume that the cost of compensa-
tion can be passed on to the consumer, see Grain Handling Co. v. Sweeney, 102 F.2d 464,
465 (2d Cir. 1939), or to the employee or consumer, see Edwards v. Piedmont Publishing
Co., 227 N.C. 184, 191, 41 S.E.2d 592, 597 (1947).
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be denied on the ground that the function of the causation requirement is to
limit the employer's responsibility to those cases where the injury has a clear
relationship to the employment.'08 When employment is a relatively insignifi-
cant contributing factor, and the statutory requirement cannot be proven, it
might be reasoned that the judiciary has no choice but to deny recovery. One
additional factor which might weigh in favor of denying recovery when causa-
tion is not clearly proven is the fact that the employer must also bear the cost
of therapy, directly or indirectly; the average cost of psychiatric therapy might
be considerably greater than the average cost of curing other bodily injuries. 109
Either granting or denying compensation could be accomplished within the
framework of existing statutes simply by manipulating the burden of proof on
the issue of causation.
The second part of the statutory formula-"in the course of employment"-
refers to the spatial and temporal aspects of the events which cause the in-
jury,- 0 thus adding another facet to the "arising out of employment" require-
ment. Not only must the causal events be related to employment, but they must
actually occur at times and in places which can be considered "at work.""'
This statement seems superfluous to the general provision governing causa-
tion.112 Moreover, in an attempt to give meaning to this separate phrase by in-
sisting on a precise and proximate connection to employment activity, courts
have sometimes made very fine distinctions when determining which acts in a
series of events are "causal." A Texas court, for example, denied compensation
to a worker injured when a metal shaving which became lodged in his hair at
108. See, e.g., Star Publishing Co. v. Jackson, 115 Ind. App. 221, 58 N.E.2d 202 (1944).
109. The extent of the employer's obligation for medical treatment will depend on
such factors as the statutory provisions, see, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 293 (1958) ; see
generally 10 ScHNEimER's TEXT §§ 2001-47, the board's determination of whether psycho-
therapy or psycho-analysis is necessary, and the criteria for judging when the employee
no longer needs treatment. The latter issue may raise particular difficulties in cases of
psychoneurotic reactions, for psychiatric and legal concepts of "fitness" may be incompatible.
The possibility that the employee may refuse to undergo treatment raises additional
problems regarding the cost of treatment. Generally where risks of harm from treatment
are low and probability of cure high, refusal will terminate benefits. Lesh v. Illinois Steel
Co., 163 Wis. 124, 157 N.W. 539 (1916), but where the risks of harm are high or the
probability of cure is speculative, the claimant cannot be forced to undergo treatment.
Melcher v. Drummond Mfg. Co., 312 Ky. 589, 229 S.W.2d 52 (1950). Although it is be-
lieved that psycho-analysis or psycho-therapy is effective in reducing both the intensity
and the duration of the disability, see ENmsH & FiNcH 139-231, subsections on treatment
of psychoneurotic reactions, the psychiatrist may be unable to predict the degree or dura-
tion of disability that would have been eliminated by submission to treatment. Hence any
denial of compensation on this ground would be based on mere speculation. Furthermore,
in a case of psychoneurosis a worker may object to analysis or therapy on non-medical
grounds, such as religious or moral beliefs, creating additional obstacles to applying the
criterion used in cases of physical injuries.
110. See generally 1 LARsox §§ 20.00-.22.
111. See, e.g., Miller v. Bill Miller's Riviera, Inc., 21 N.J. Super. 112, 90 A.2d 889
(Super. Ct. 1952) ; Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Bruce, 249 Ala. 675, 32 So. 2d 666 (1947).
112. See 1 LARsoNT §§ 29.00-22.
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work fell into his eye fifteen minutes after the close of working hours." 3 Such
attempts to isolate the causative event seem particularly inappropriate in cases
involving psychoneurotic injury, since in those cases more than any other the
chain of causation is likely to be tangled and complex.
THE EFFECT OF AWARDING COMPENSATION
Effect on Hiring Practices
One result of awarding compensation for psychoneurotic reactions may be
that employers, whose insurance rates are generally based on the accident
record of their employees," 4 will exclude potential psychoneurotics, as they
now exclude certain types of epileptics, from assuming gainful employment."15
At present, the threat to the worker is probably minimal. Since most persons
who are vulnerable to forming a psychoneurotic reaction as a result of an in-
dustrial accident appear "normal" when hired,"06 the use of screening devices
would be necessary to detect potential psychoneurotics. Whether the use of
such tests is feasible will depend upon their predictive ability "11 as well as the
particular needs of the employer. Such factors as the labor supply available
and the administrative cost of testing may well outweigh the expense of in-
creased insurance rates. Even if screening devices were feasible, the financial
motive for excluding potential psychoneurotics from employment could be met
by placing the burden of liability for psychoneurotic reactions upon a special
fund which would be financed by a uniform rate of contribution from all em-
ployers, perhaps fashioned after the second injury fund now used in almost all
workmen's compensation systems.".$
113. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Steel, 229 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
114. For a discussion of the general mode of rate making, see Wisconsin Compensation
Rating and Inspection Bureau v. Mortensen, 227 Wis. 335, 277 N.W. 679 (1938) ; State
ex rel. Minnesota Employers' Ass'n v. Farcy, 236 Minn. 468, 53 N.W.2d 457 (1952);
SOMERS & SoMERs 102-10.
115. A similar problem has arisen in connection with nonapportionment of liability
for handicapped workers. For example, it has been estimated that requiring the employer
to bear full responsibility for total disability for loss of a worker's remaining arm, leg, or
eye, resulted in the displacement of approximately 7,000 to 8,000 "one-eyed, one-legged,
one-armed, and one-handed men" in Oklahoma. 2 LARSON § 59.32, citing U.S. B.L.S. Bull.
No. 536 [1931] at 272, statement by I. K. Huber.
116. Kubie, The Fundamenetal Nature of the Distinction Between Normality and
Neurosis, 23 PSYCHOANALYTIC QUARTERLY (1954). "
117. See generally RAPAPORT, DIAGNOSTIC PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING (1945).
118. A second injury fund "makes the employer ultimately liable only for the amount
of disability attributable to the particular injury occurring in his employment, while the
fund pays the difference between that amount and the total amount to which the employee
is entitled for the combined effects of his prior and present injury." I LARSON § 59.31, at
59. New York has used several types of special funds to meet various contingencies. See,
e.g., N.Y. WORKMEN'S ComIP. LAW § 25(a) (Fund for Reopened Cases); § 15(9) (Voca-
tional Rehabilitation Fund).
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Prevention of Injury
The effect of the compensation award in relation to the goal of injury pre-
vention should also be considered. In the usual industrial injury case, the in-
crease in the employer's insurance rates may induce him to adopt means by
which the risk of injury will be reduced." 9 This will not be true in most cases
of psychoneuroses, however, since the events which will trigger a psychoneu-
rotic reaction vary with the indivdual and probably cannot be accurately pre-
dicted and prevented.'
20
Arguably, the availability of compensation may tend to increase the rate of
psychoneurotic injury by contributing to the formation of the psychoneurotic
reaction. Many different external and internal factors may precipitate a psycho-
neurosis. The basic factor is a threat from within the personality-the individ-
ual's need to relieve unconscious fear or guilt.12' In Freudian terms, when re-
pressed id 122 impulses threaten to discharge into consciousness and can no
longer be repressed, the ego, 23 in order to reconcile the demands of the in-
stinctual id impulses with reality and conscience, attempts by symptom forma-
tion to reach the best possible compromise solution among competing inter-
ests. 124 By allowing the least harmful release of psychic tension, the ego attains
a real advantage which is termed the "primary gain" of the psychoneurotic ill-
ness.1 25 In some cases, external advantages may contribute additional uncon-
scious motives for falling ill.126 For example, one psychiatrist has stated that
the development of an anxiety state by a soldier in combat "may be uncon-
sciously influenced by the knowledge that it will lead to removal to safety."'
2 7
119. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
120. Of course, the employer may, in certain instances, be able to prevent the precipi-
tation of a psychoneurosis in a person whom he knows is under severe stress or is not well
adapted to his job, by lessening the employee's work load or by moving him to another
position.
121. See BRENNER 211.
122. The id, a part of the unconscious, is the reservoir for all psychic energy and is
the source of instinctual drives. According to Freud, "it has no organization and no unified
will, only an impulsion to obtain satisfaction for the instinctual needs, in accordance with
the pleasure-principle." HiNSm & CAMPBELL 362, quoting FREUD, NEw INTRODUCTORY
LEcTURES ON Psycno-ANALYsis (Sprott transl. 1933).
123. See note 15 supra.
124. BRENNER 211.
125. Ibid.
126. See FREUD, 7 STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS 43
(Strachey transl. 1953) :
In every neurotic illness a primary gain has ... to be recognized. In the first place,
falling ill involves a saving of psychical effort; it emerges as being essentially the
most convenient solution where there is mental conflict .... This element in the
primary gain may be described as the internal or psychological one, and it is, so to
say, a constant one. But, beyond this, external factors, (such as . . . the situation
of a woman subjugated by her husband) may contribute motives for falling ill and
these will constitute the external element in the primary gain.
But see Saul & Lyons, supra note 104, at 155-56.
127. BRENNER 212. Brenner limits this theory, however, by noting that "there are many
1146 [Vol. 70:1129
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Little psychiatric data has been found relating to the question of whether
financial gain can provide such a motive. In all probability, an assessment of
the respective roles of the wish for monetary gain and other unconscious
mechanisms would be a virtually impossible task. Even assuming, as is probably
the case, that the prospect of compensation does provide an additional motive
in some cases,12 8 whether and how often it would have a dispositive effect on
borderline cases is still speculative. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe
that an unconscious motivation for remuneration has any different effect in
cases of psychoneurosis than it has in typical industrial accident cases caused
by lack of care on the part of the employee.
1 2 9
Employee Rehabilitation
The receipt of financial aid may affect the duration of the psychoneurotic
reaction and may therefore be incompatible with the aim of rehabilitating the
employee. As has been seen, the individual has developed the psychoneurotic
reaction in order to achieve the best possible adaptation to his environment.
But he has not resolved his underlying psychic conflict and hence the continu-
ation of the psychoneurotic reaction is necessary to prevent the re-emergence
into consciousness of the repressed id impulses. This defensive operation of the
ego is the primary factor sustaining the psychoneurotic reaction. In addition,
however, external benefits, such as the receipt of sympathy, attention, or com-
pensation may unconsciously aid in prolonging the reaction and perhaps even
heightening its intensity.130 Two basic reasons are presented by psychiatrists
to explain the significance of such factors. First, the external benefits may help
the individual to adapt to his psychoneurotic reaction. The receipt of compen-
sation may satisfy dependency or aggressive needs. It may also reduce financial
worries resulting from the psychoneurotic reaction, thus reinforcing the effec-
tiveness of the reaction as a conflict-reducing device.' 31 Second, many psychia-
trists accept the view that such external benefits may constitute advantages
cases in which there is no question of such a possibility and in which the neurosis comes
to have a certain value to the individual only after its development." Ibid.
128. See NoYEs & KoLB 514.
129. It is generally assumed by psychiatrists that an accidental mishap which is caused
by the individual's own actions is the result of an unconscious intent to produce the accident
as a means of at least partially satisfying such elements as aggression, dependency or
punition. BRENNER 150-57; MENNINGER, MAN AGAINST HIMSELF 278-94 (Harvest Book
ed. 1959).
130. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, FUNDAMENTALS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 212-13 (1948) [here-
inafter cited as ALEXANDER] ("emotional and financial gains derived from illness contrib-
ute to the prolongation of illness"). Keschner 343 ("the clinical picture following an acci-
dent in which legal liability is involved varies strikingly from that following a similar
accident in which the injured person claims no compensation or damages for negligence").
131. FENIcHEL 126-27 ("Obtaining financial compensation or fighting for one creates
a poor atmosphere for psychotherapy, the more so if the compensation brings not only
rational advantages but has acquired the unconscious meaning of love and protecting secu-
rity as well."
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which are independent of those associated with the release of psychic tension.
A desire to retain these bonuses may unconsciously motivate the individual to
prolong the psychoneurotic reaction once it has arisen.132 The receipt of com-
pensation is frequently cited as an example of this form of secondary gain.1 33
Despite an awareness of the ramifications of granting compensation on the
rehabilitation of the employee, courts have generally failed to consider the al-
ternatives open to them to minimize the adverse psychological effect of the
award, and have usually granted continuous payments, if all other criteria for
compensation have been satisfied.'3 4
As a solution to this compensation-rehabilitation dilemma, lump sum pay-
ments which cannot be appealed or modified have been suggested on the belief
132. HENDRICxS, FACTS AND THEORIES OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 235-36 (1958) ("'Sec-
ondary gain' comprises the secondary benefits which people with neurosis strive to obtain
from their symptoms . . . 'Secondary gain' is the result of the effort to win from the
neurosis itself a 'bonus,' consisting in additional pleasures which could not be obtained
without it") ; BRENNER 211-12:
The secondary gain is merely a special case of the ceaseless efforts of the ego to
exploit the possibilities for pleasurable gratification which are available to it. Once
a symptom has been formed, the ego may discover that there are advantages which
the symptom brings with it .... From the point of view of their treatment, . . .
[secondary gains] may result in the fact that the patient unconsciously prefers to
keep his neurosis rather than to lose it, since his symptoms have become valuable to
him. The treatment of severe obesity, for example, is always a difficult matter, but
it becomes impossible if the patient is a fat lady in a circus, who makes her living
from her illness.
These psychiatric statements are based on clinical observations and not upon statistical
studies. Although few surveys have been conducted on this point, studies on similar issues
tend to corroborate the psycho-analytic position. See, e.g., Krusen & Ford, Compensation
Factor in Low Back Injuries, J. AmERCAN Medical Ass'n (1958), in which 509 patients
were studied for 5 years, 54% of whom were eligible for compensation, while 46% were
not. Utilizing various control measures, the authors found that after treatment, 55.8% of
the group receiving compensation were rated as improved, whereas 88.5% of those not
receiving compensation were rated as improved. The observed difference in improvement
between men who anticipated compensation and those who did not was 27.2%, while the
difference to be expected on the basis of chance was only 9.6%.
133. See notes 130-31 supra. "Being incapacitated by illness may have certain advan-
tages. Among the most transparent is financial compensation for accidents.... These ad-
vantages retard recovery and make therapy particularly difficult.' ALEXANDER 212-13.
134. See, e.g., Simon v. R. H. H. Steel Laundry, Inc., 25 N.J. Super. 50, 95 A.2d 446
(Hudson County Ct. L. 1953) ; Murray v. Industrial Comm'n, 87 Ariz. 190, 195, 349 P.2d
627 (1960) ; Moses v. R. H. Wright & Son, Inc., 90 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1956).
Several courts have investigated the causal relation between the prolongation of a psy-
choneurotic reaction and its initial formation. Although some courts have denied compen-
sation for the continuation of a psychoneurotic reaction, see, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Ware,
53 Ga. App. 500, 186 S.E. 452 (1936), the majority has not viewed secondary gains as in-
dependent, intervening factors. See, e.g., Hood v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 522, 209
S.W.2d 345, 347-48 (1948). The latter view is in accord with psychiatric theory, for sec-
ondary gains are an expected and usual result of the injury serving as an additional uncon-
scious sustaining force, and are not a "substitution" for the initial need for the psycho-
neurotic reaction.
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that the receipt of a settlement which cannot be extended or discontinued will
remove the monetary incentive for the employee unconsciously to prolong the
duration of his disability.135 Although nearly every state workmen's compen-
sation statute has a provision allowing lump sum payments, 136 the courts have
not looked upon them with favor, for it is feared that an imprudent employee
will waste the means provided for his support if he receives the money all at
once.13 7 This objection could be met, however, by providing for periodic pay-
ments to the employee over a stated period of time in the future, with the pay-
ments not contingent on the worker's continued disability, and with the award
not subject to reopening.
138
A more serious flaw in this proposal, however, is the difficulty of predicting
the duration of psychoneurotic disability. Determining the duration of a psycho-
neurotic reaction entails an evaluation of complex factors, many of which may
change during the course of therapy.139 There is a substantial likelihood, there-
fore, that the psychiatrist's prediction, and hence the court's determination, of
the length of disability will be wrong in any individual case.140 When the period
for which compensation is awarded is greater than the actual period of dis-
ability, the employer may suffer a disproportionate increment in his rate sched-
ule. On the other hand, this added cost may be canceled out by errors in the
opposite direction, and by a general reduction in the cost of payments to those
who are more speedily rehabilitated under this system. Even if individual em-
ployers do bear higher costs, the added charge may be a justifiable policy choice
in favor of the rehabilitative goal, particularly if the costs can be spread.
But in those cases where the psychoneurotic reaction lasts beyond the esti-
mated period of illness, the finality of the lump sum award will thwart the
workmen's compensation goal of preventing destitution. A miscalculation,
whether in terms of months or even weeks, can work a hardship on a disabled
worker who is thereby left without compensation. Utilization of a loan plan
in conjunction with lump sum payments might help reduce this conflict be-
tween the goals of rehabilitation and compensation. By permitting the employee
135. See, e.g., FENIcEL 127; HUDDLESON, ACCIDENTS, NEuRoSES AND COMPENSATION
178-97 (1932); Smith & Solomon, Traumatic Neuroses in Court, 30 VA. L. REv. 87, 146
(1943) ; Miller, The Compensation Neurosis, 4 J. FO. Sc. 159 (1959); Schaller, Psycho-
neurosis and Industry, 2 OccUPATIONA. MEDICINE 183-89 (1946).
136. See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE ANN. § 5100; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.20(9), (10).
The courts or statutes generally require that the lump sum be in the best interests of either
party, see, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE, supra, or that the money be intended for a specific pur-
pose, such as to pay a debt, McMullen v. Gavette Constr. Co., 207 Mich. 586, 175 N.W.
120 (1919), or to pay attorney's or physician's fees, Carr v. State Industrial Acc. Comm'n,
153 Ore. 517, 57 P.2d 1278 (1936).
137. See, e.g., Eagle Fluorspar Co. v. La Rue, 231 Ky. 757, 21 S.W.2d 1026 (1929).
138. Generally, payments are made periodically, but the employer, as well as the em-
ployee, can petition to have his case reopened for changed medical conditions. See, e.g.,
N.Y. WORXMEN'S ComP. LAw § 15.
139. See notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text.
140. Ibid.
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whose disability lasts longer than was anticipated to petition the board for a
loan, destitution of the worker or his dependents could be prevented. Whether
this program would reduce the incentive to unconsciously prolong the psycho-
neurotic reaction is open to question. Perhaps the desire to avoid repayment of
the loan, once indebted, would be an equally great incentive to remain ill.
141
In addition, such a plan would present numerous administrative difficulties,
such as financing the fund, establishing criteria for granting the loan, and pro-
viding for collection and repayment.
In view of the difficulty of erecting a compensation scheme that will not
impede rehabilitation, it seems preferable to retain the present system of pay-
ments. The goal of speedier rehabilitation will be better served by focusing on
the process of therapy itself, by ensuring that provisions for treatment of com-
pensable injuries are flexible enough to accommodate the often lengthy and
expensive demands of psychiatric therapy.
142
MARILYN COHENf
141. The continuous mounting of a debt during the course of therapy may very well
work counter to the atmosphere needed for rehabilitation. Furthermore, if the employee
died before he had discharged his debt, repayment of the loan might place an undue burden
on his survivors at a time when they were financially least able to bear it. On the other
hand, if his death cancelled the loan, this factor may serve as a strong incentive to the
employee, particularly in the older age group, to remain ill.
142. In many states, see note 8 supra, this will necessitate a statutory change in the
monetary limits and maximum periods in which the employer must provide for reasonable
medical expenses.
tThird year student, Yale Law School.
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